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Controversy Aroused: North Carolina Mandates Insurance
Coverage of Contraceptives in the Wake of Viagra
The much-heralded entrance of Viagra into the pharmaceutical
market has brought with it some unexpected side effects besides
headaches and facial flushing. Its treatment in the United States
insurance industry has resulted in a surge of legislative attention'
reviving a long-dormant concern: gender-based inequity in insurance
coverage.2 American women continue to voice outrage at the
1. David A. Fahrenthold, Woman Sues for Contraceptive Coverage, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2000, at A3 ("The issue [of state and federal mandates for insurance plans to
provide contraceptive coverage] gained national attention in the mid- to late-1990s, when
health insurance companies began to provide coverage for the prescription drug Viagra
for men."); Ellen Goodman, Other Views: Class Action Lawsuit Tests Insurance Rules on
the Pill, OLYMPIAN (Olympia, Wash.), July 30, 2000, http://news.theolympian.com/stories/
20000730/Opinion/99336.shtml (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("But a few
years ago, when insurance plans began picking up the tab for Viagra, the light bulb went
on over the medicine cabinet. How come employee health care plans covered pro and not
contra-ception?"); Phil Galewitz, HMO to Cover Birth Control, at http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/living/DailyNews/hmo.ontracteptives 981016.html [sic] (Oct. 16, 1998) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (citing the demand for Viagra as part of the impetus
behind new health insurance plans for federal employees that will cover prescription
contraceptives if they cover other prescriptions drugs); Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, Women's Health.- Health Insurance Coverage for Contraceptives, at
http://www.ncsl.orgtprograms/health/contrace.htm (last modified July 27, 2000) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter NCSL, Women's Health] ("The
momentum to support coverage of contraceptives increased when the male impotence
drug, Viagra, entered the market and insurers covered its costs."); Women's Groups Urge
Coverage of Contraceptives, at http://www.insure.com/health/zzbcontrol699.html (last
updated June 11, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("The issue [of
pushing through legislation to ensure contraceptive coverage for women] gained steam
when the male impotence drug Viagra came onto the market.").
Viagra was introduced into the public market in April 1998. Kim H. Finley,
Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra? Demand for "Lifestyle" Drugs Raises
Legal and Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. L. REV. 837, 837 (2000); Marlene Cimons, FDA
Approves First Pill for Impotence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 28, 1998, at
4A; Food & Drug Admin., Consumer Information About Viagra, at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/consumerinfo/viagra/viagraconsumer.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The first broad state mandate requiring insurance companies to cover
contraceptives was also passed in April 1998. Act of April 28, 1998, ch. 117, 1998 Md.
Laws 1194 (codified at MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 15-826 (Supp. 2000)); Jena Heath, State
Senate Votes to Require Contraceptive Coverage, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Mar. 5, 1999, at 1A.
2. Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don't
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astonishing speed with which access to Viagra has been provided in
the United States, given the distinctly less favorable treatment
accorded reversible contraceptive methods3 by the insurance
industry.4
Want You to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 120-21 (1998); Lisa A.
Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v.
Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 172, 195 (1999); Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination
and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1998); Finley, supra note
1, at 840; see also Debra Baker, Viagra Spawns Birth Control Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998,
at 36, 36 (1998) (quoting Kathryn Kolbert, the reproductive rights lawyer who argued
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and co-founded the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy: "This is a problem that is so obvious it got hidden. Because
women were denied coverage for so long, no one ever questioned it. Viagra demonstrates
the inequities."); Rehka Basu, Birth ControL" 'Claim Denied,' REG. (Des Moines, Iowa),
Mar. 7, 1999, 1999 WL 7197347 (observing that Viagra demonstrates the extent to which
women's health needs have been marginalized through discriminatory insurance
coverage); Michelle Brutlag, Bill Tells Insures to Level the Viagra Playing Field, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 21, 1999, § 4, at 3 (pointing to the "injustice" found by Rep. Mary Flowers, the
proponent of Illinois' now-defeated version of the "pill bill," that the same insurers who
cover Viagra refuse coverage for birth control); Carey Goldberg, Insurance for Viagra
Spurs Coverage for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at Al (observing the belief
held by sponsors of several successful contraceptive coverage mandate bills that birth
control's parallel to Viagra has been a strong argument against opposition); Sharon
Lerner, Uncovered Sex, VILLAGE VoICE, June 15, 1999, at 56 (stating that for women,
"exclusion of birth control [from insurance coverage] has come to feel like just another
unfair fact of life" and referencing one prominent pill historian's puzzlement that the oral
contraceptive, one of the few points of consensus between pro-life and pro-choice factions,
has nevertheless historically been blacklisted by insurance companies); Virginia Postrel,
Sex Mandates, FORBES, May 31, 1999, at 121, 121 (discussing the "lifestyle" versus
"medically necessary" treatment distinction raised by both Viagra and contraceptive
coverage); Paul Rauber, It's a Man's World, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 20,20 (noting that
only a few months after Viagra's introduction into the market, half of all prescriptions
were covered by insurers, whereas almost forty years after the introduction of the pill, only
fifteen percent of traditional indemnity insurance plans and less than forty percent of
health maintenance organizations covered all five of the most common reversible
contraceptives); Darlene Superville, Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives Likely for
Federal Work Force, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, Md.), Sept. 17, 1998, at 10B, 1998 WL
9509102 ("As health insurers jockeyed to cover the pill that promised to spice up men's
dormant sex lives, angry women's groups began criticizing the reluctance of many of the
same companies to pay for prescription contraceptives for women.").
3. "Reversible" is the term generally used by commentators and health experts to
refer to contraceptive methods less permanent than sterilization. See, e.g., Law, supra
note 2, at 369 (comparing sterilization, which is, "as a practical matter, irreversible," with
other more temporary types of birth control).
4. Brutlag, supra note 2 (noting Illinois Representative Mary Flowers' view that it is
an "'injustice that some of those same insurers pay for Viagra yet won't always cover an
old standby such as birth control pills"); Goldberg, supra note 2 (commenting on the
"Viagra effect" of uproar from women's groups regarding inequity in contraceptive
coverage). Many consumers, however, are unaware that their insurance plans omit
contraceptives from coverage. Brutlag, supra note 2 (quoting Representative Mary
Flowers: "Here in America, you don't know [if oral contraceptives can be obtained
through insurance] until you actually try to apply for it or get it."). At least one
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As the proposed federal Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC)5 languishes in congressional
committee, and as several state legislatures implement broad
contraceptive coverage mandates of their own,6 the "little blue pill"
has demonstrated a remarkable ability to arouse not only ardor in
eager consumers, but also heated debate in all levels of American
government This debate includes issues regarding insurance costs,
"quality of life" versus "medically necessary" treatments, and the
forces of the free market versus legislatively-authored insurance
contracts. Although Viagra and contraceptives are not medicinally
parallel in nature or function, both provide a degree of control over
an individual's sexuality that would otherwise be absent. The
acceptance of Viagra as a medication generally covered by insurance
has raised numerous issues regarding the coverage of contraceptives
and insurance equity.
North Carolina recently followed seven other states9 and passed
section 58-3-178 of the North Carolina General Statutes,10 a broad
commentator has remarked on the inability of U.S. employers and employees to obtain
concrete information about what is and is not covered under a given health insurance plan,
despite a legal entitlement to know. Law, supra note 2, at 386; see also Sharon Lerner,
Bitter Pill, WORKING WOMAN, Nov. 1999, at 22,22 (noting many lawmakers' ignorance of
the fact that insurance companies typically exempt contraceptive coverage from policies
that otherwise cover most forms of prescriptions).
5. S. 104, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1200, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2120, 106th Cong.
(1999).
6. For a comprehensive summary of contraception-related state law, see NCSL,
Women's Health, supra note 1; NARAL Resources: Insurance Coverage for Contraception,
at http:l/naral.orglmediaresourceslpublications/2000Ichartsinsurance.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2000) [hereinafter NARAL Resources] (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
7. See NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1 (noting the momentum in state
legislatures); infra note 91 (discussing action at the federal level).
8. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a) (West 2000); 1999 Conn. Acts
99-79 §§ 1(a), 2(a) (Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(b)(1) (Supp. 2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756,
2847-G, 4247 (West 2000); MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 15-826 (Supp. 2000); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415, 689A.0417, 689B.0377 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 415:18-i, 420-A:17-c, 420-B:8-gg (Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c
(Supp. 2000).
10. Act of June 30, 1999, No. 231, 1999 N.C. Sess Laws 555.
11. "Broad" in this context indicates a state mandate that requires all insurers,
without qualification, to provide coverage for a range of medically approved
contraceptives if they offer prescription drug coverage. See NCSL, Women's Health, supra
note 1. Other states limit their mandates to certain types of plans or require only that
contraceptive coverage not be automatically absent from an employer's list of options. See
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contraceptive coverage mandate.'" The purpose of this Note is to
trace the contours of the current legal landscape regarding mandated
contraceptive coverage, with some specific attention paid to the
North Carolina statute. This Note initially discusses the legal and
policy considerations both in favor of and against a contraceptive
coverage mandate13-considerations that certainly played a role in
the passage of the North Carolina law.14 The Note demonstrates that
considerations supporting mandated contraceptive coverage are fairly
compelling 5 and include a favorable cost-benefit analysis,' 6 the
potential applicability of Title VII to the gender-based impact
resulting from a lack of contraceptive coverage, 7 and the areas of
non-preemption left open to the states by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).'8 The Note likewise reveals
that considerations disfavoring mandated contraceptive coverage,
including the categorical distinction between "medically necessary"
and "quality-of-life" treatments 9 and the concept of moral hazard,20
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178 (1999). Although twenty-three states' laws address
contraceptive coverage to some degree, only eight states, including North Carolina, have
truly broad mandates. NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1. For example, Hawaii and
Virginia, two states taking a narrower but nonetheless significant approach, have passed
laws prohibiting insurers from excluding coverage of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs
and devices as an employer option. HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604.5 (1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1999); NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1. These
provisions do not mandate coverage. HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604.5; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1999); NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1. Part of Texas's
administrative code prohibits insurers from excluding coverage for oral contraceptives if
other prescription drugs are covered. 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.404(3) (West 2000);
NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1. The Texas law mandates coverage of the birth
control pill alone, though it is only one of several contraceptive methods that are available
solely by prescription. 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.404(3) ("No insurer may exclude from
prescription drug benefits oral contraceptives when all other prescription drugs are
covered."). For a general overview of FDA-approved contraceptive options, see Tamar
Nordenberg, Protecting Against Unintended Pregnancy: A Guide to Contraceptive
Choices, at http:llwww.fda.gov/fdac/features/1997/397_baby.html (June 2000) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
13. Infra notes 26-127 and accompanying text.
14. Heath, supra note 1 (noting the bill sponsor's view that its passage was required
for insurance equity for women and noting that the bill's primary opponent was the
National Federation of Independent Businesses); Wade Rawlins, Birth Control Coverage
Advances, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 16, 1999, at 1A (noting one mandate
supporter's view that the legislative measure was necessary as a matter of insurance equity
and one mandate opponent's view that the statute would harm small businesses).
15. See Heath, supra note 1; Rawlins, supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 26-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 98,111-18 and accompanying text.
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are more problematic in their nature and application. The Note,
however, then indicates that anti-mandate concerns such as increased
insurance cost and the inflexibility inherent in government-dictated
benefit plans are harder to discount.2' Having taken notice of these
legal and policy considerations, the Note then discusses section 58-3-
178 of the North Carolina General Statutes and compares it to similar
provisions in other states.' A close analysis of certain aspects of
North Carolina's broad mandate and comparable mandates from
other states reveals some narrow restrictions hidden in their
purported breadth.23 Finally, the Note discusses certain construction-
based loopholes that may be available to avoid some of the effects of
narrow interpretations,24 at least until more comprehensive mandates
are available through either preemptive federal legislation or a more
expansive judicial interpretation of the federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA).
Favorable public opinion and the results of a cost benefit analysis
provide a compelling argument for a contraceptive coverage
mandate. One poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that eight in ten Americans, both male and female, would
support insurance coverage of contraceptives up to a hypothetical
cost increase of five dollars per month.26 Despite this indication of
public support, the question of cost-benefit balance is far from settled
in the controversy over mandated insurance benefits. Indeed, dollar-
related concerns 7 preoccupied the minds of opponents of section 58-
21. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
26. Andrew Herrmann, Paying Up Front or Paying Later, CHi. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 7,
1999, at 33, 1999 WL 6533369. Herrmann emphasizes that the five dollar increase is purely
hypothetical and that these willing eight out of ten Americans would in fact have to pay
far less. Id. (referring to the 1998 finding of the Alan Guttmacher Institute that covering
contraception would cost employers about $1.43 more per month and cost employees only
about thirty-six cents more per month); see also Hayden, supra note 2, at 195 ("A Kaiser
Family Foundation poll indicated that seventy-five percent of all Americans support
insurance coverage for contraceptives while only fifty percent advocated coverage of
Viagra.").
27. The projected annual cost of North Carolina's "pill bill" is seventeen dollars per
employer and four dollars per employee. Rawlins, supra note 14. These annual figures
reflect the monthly cost estimated by the Alan Guttmacher Institute study conducted in
June, 1998. Jacqueline E. Darroch, Cost to Employer Health Plans of Covering
Contraceptives: Summary, Methodology and Background, at nn.21 & 23, at
http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/kaiser_0698.html (June 1998) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (listing study findings regarding employer cost per contraceptive type); see
also Heath, supra note 1 (listing the monthly cost estimated by the Alan Guttmacher
2001]
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3-178 of the North Carolina General Statutes.2'
At least one notable and often cited study29 found that the
prevention of pregnancy and pregnancy-related costs through the use
of contraceptives resulted in "substantial economic savings and social
benefits."3 These economic savings especially benefited third parties
in insurance plans who would otherwise have borne the brunt of
pregnancy-associated expenses.3 Central to the analysis of the study
was the assumption that, if contraceptives were covered by insurance,
individuals who do not use birth control because of its expense would
begin practicing a covered contraceptive method.32  Thus far,
however, no studies have been conducted exploring the validity of
this basic assumption upon which much of the cost-benefit analysis in
Institute study conducted in June 1998); Herrmann, supra note 26 (same). As one
commentator deftly remarked, "[a]lthough this figure [reflecting the cost of contraceptive
coverage] may appear expensive to some .... [compare it] with the $100.00 cost per month
per male for Viagra." Hayden, supra note 2, at 186.
28. See Rawlins, supra note 14. North Carolina state representative Charlotte
Gardner, a Republican and one of only two women to vote against the House version of
the bill, maintained that the cost incurred would pose too great a burden on small
businesses, ld. Similar business concerns have been voiced in other states considering this
kind of legislation. See A. Jay Higgins, King Threatens to Veto Contraceptive Pill Bill,
DAILY NEWS (Bangor, Me.), May 18, 1999, 1999 WL 3296388 (noting Governor King's
concern that raising the overall cost of insurance would negatively affect Maine's ability to
attract job applicants and businesses); Viagra and Birth Control, N.Y. POST, July 3, 1999,
at 16, 1999 WL 20998030 (discussing how raises in across-the-board coverage costs lead to
a choice between either laying off part of the work force or radically raising the amount of
money employees must contribute to health care). See generally Beh, supra note 2, at 138(stating that critics of state insurance coverage mandates typically argue that the mandates
"raise premiums, reduce consumer choice, disproportionately concentrate health care
resources on particular health problems, and eventually increase the number of uninsured
individuals").
29. James Trussell et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15
Methods, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494 (1995), cited in, e.g., Beh, supra note 2, at 120-21,
nn.8-9; Law, supra note 2, at 366, n.13; Darroch, supra note 27.
30. Trussell et al., supra note 29, at 502.
31. Id. at 500. Third-party payers cover most of the bills for these pregnancy and
pregnancy-related expenses-births, newborn hospitalizations, ectopic pregnancies, and
spontaneous abortions. Id In addition, most private plans include coverage for induced
abortion. Id. As the Trussell study concludes, "any technology that reduces the incidence
of these events provides considerable savings to payers." Id.
32. If coverage of contraceptives simply leads to the financing of birth control for
users who would otherwise have paid out-of-pocket, then the third-party payers' overall
costs are likely to increase. Id. Only a corresponding decrease in pregnancy will partially
or completely absorb the additional cost of contraceptive coverage. If, however, only
fifteen percent of women previously not using any method of birth control were to begin
using one as a result of insurance coverage, savings in pregnancy care costs alone would
cover any money spent on oral contraceptive pills for all other users in a given plan. Philip
R. Lee & Felicia H. Stewart, Editorial: Failing to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy is Costly.
85 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 479,479 (1995).
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favor of contraceptive coverage hinges.33
If coverage of contraceptives did result in an overall reduction of
pregnancy, available statistics suggest that the recouped financial
costs would be considerable. 34 Unintended pregnancies account for
almost sixty percent of the 6.3 million pregnancies in the United
States each year.3 This figure is higher than that of any other
developed country except France.3 6  Of those unintended
pregnancies, more than half occur among the ten percent of
American women who report that they use no birth control method. 37
A vaginal birth with no complications costs approximately five to six
thousand dollars.38 Assuming insurance coverage of contraceptives
annually costs an employer twenty dollars per female employee,39 the
33. See Trussell et al., supra note 29, at 500 ("[I]f broader coverage leads to improved
access and substantially more effective contraceptive use, our models suggest that payers
may save resources by avoiding the costs of unintended pregnancies. Clearly, additional
studies will be necessary to address this issue."). Studies done concerning the impact of
contraceptive price changes on the level of demand for those contraceptives generally
have focused on developing countries. See Barbara Janowitz & John H. Bratt, What Do
We Really Know About the Impact of Price Changes on Contraceptive Use?, INT'L FAM.
PLAN. PERSP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 38, 38-40; United Nations Population Info. Network,
Summary of Discussions (Session Three: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Family Planning), at
http:lwww.undp.orglpopinlunfpalpubsleconmeetsect4.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
34. See generally Darroch, supra note 27 (providing a summary of estimated cost of
contraceptive coverage by Buck Consultants for the Alan Guttmacher Institute). In
Darroch's words, "[c]omparisons of use of highly effective methods with those that are
more difficult to use successfully or with nonuse ... clearly show that effective
contraceptive use when couples are sexually active and do not want to have a child leads
to better health and to lower health care costs." d
35. Law, supra note 2, at 364 (citing INST. OF MED., THE BEST INTENTION:
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 1
(Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995)).
36. Id. (citing Elise F. Jones et al., Unintended Pregnancy, Contraceptive Practice and
Family Planning Services in Developed Countries, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 53,55 (1998)).
37. Id. (citing Alan Guttmacher Institute, Contraception Counts: State-by-State
Information, May 1997, at 1). The Trussell study found that the absence of any birth
control method over the course of five years resulted in 4.25 unintended pregnancies at a
cost to the insurance carrier of roughly $14,500 in a managed care plan and $6,500 in a
traditional indemnity plan. Trussell et al., supra note 29, at 497. Dr. Trussell's costs of
unintended pregnancy "included costs incurred from time of conception until pregnancy
termination, including costs associated with ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous abortion,
induced abortion, and term delivery." Id. at 496. The costs of term delivery consisted of
prenatal care, delivery, and newborn hospitalization. Id For a table illustrating a
breakdown of the pregnancy costs according to these various outcomes, see id. at 497 tbl.4.
38. Kathleen O'Connor, Editorial, Birth Control Coverage: Productivity vs.
Reproductivity, SAN FRANCISCO Bus. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999,
http://sanfrancisco.bcentral.com/sanfrancisco/stories/1999/03/29/editorial5.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
39. Id.
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cost of the coverage for one normal vaginal delivery resulting from an
unintended and preventable pregnancy would cover the costs of
contraceptive coverage for three hundred women.40 Moreover, apart
from the expenses associated with the pregnancy itself, children of
unintended pregnancies are more likely to bring with them increased
costs associated with prolonged post-natal medical care.4' As a
preventive measure, in other words, contraceptive coverage more
than pays for itself. Pregnancy-related costs and the costs of
prolonged post-natal care are avoided by preventing pregnancy
altogether.
The perceived inequity in insurance coverage for women stems
from the fact that their out-of-pocket health care costs coincide
directly with a lack of coverage for contraception-related care. Most
women experience approximately 20.5 childbearing years during
which, if they are sexually active and not pregnant or seeking to
become pregnant, they require contraception.42  During this
potentially reproductive time period, three-quarters of American
women fund their medical care expenses through traditional
indemnity insurance plans,4' 3 two-thirds of which exclude coverage for
contraceptive pills.' As Professor Sylvia Law notes, "only fifteen
percent of traditional indemnity plans provide coverage for all of the
40. Id.; see also Rawlins, supra note 14 (noting the observation of a small-business
owner and North Carolina State Representative, Cherie Berry, that she thought the
additional cost of contraceptive coverage for employees of small businesses was dwarfed
by the cost and disruption of an unwanted pregnancy).
41. Hayden, supra note 2, at 187 ("The estimated expense of childbirth and follow-up
care rises dramatically to an average of between $14,000 and $30,000 per year for the first
year of life for infants born with a low birth-weight."); Law, supra note 2, at 366
("Reducing unintended pregnancy is the single most effective means of reducing the
number of distressed, low birth weight babies [and the resulting costs of their care]."
(citing INST. OF MED., TE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE
WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 1 (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds.,
1995))); Patricia H. Shiono & Richard E. Behrman, Low Birth Weight: Analysis and
Recommendations, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1995, at 5, available at
http://www.futureofchildren.orglLBW/02LBWANA.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) ("[O]f the $11 billion spent on health care for infants today, approximately
35% ($4 billion) of these dollars are spent on the incremental costs of low birth weight
infants .... "). Contra Shiono & Behrman, supra, at 43 ("It is unclear whether or not the
observed decreased rates of low birth weight among women who receive prenatal care are
due to the effectiveness of prenatal care in preventing low birth weight or are due to other
differences between women who receive prenatal care and those who do not."). These
differences include more advanced education levels and other socioeconomic advantages
that may lead to better health. Id
42. Beh, supra note 2, at 165. Of course, contraceptives are unnecessary if a woman
chooses abstinence.
43. Darroch, supra note 27.
44. Law, supra note 2, at 369-70.
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most commonly used reversible prescription contraceptives, and
forty-nine percent of plans cover none of these methods."'45 HMOs,
in contrast, tend to provide somewhat more equitable coverage;
eighty-four percent cover birth control pills; 46 however, only about
half of HMOs cover diaphragms, IUDs, or Depo-Provera injections.47
Surprisingly, in 1995, the greatest number of American contraceptive
users-approximately thirty-nine percent-relied upon sterilization
as their chosen preventative method.4s  This state of affairs is
explainable in part because sterilization is the form of contraception
most commonly covered by private insurance benefits.49  Largely
because all reversible prescription contraceptive methods are
currently available only for female use, 0 and because insurance
coverage for such methods is limited, if provided at all, women spend
approximately sixty-eight percent more in out-of-pocket health care
costs than men.5 1 The general consensus is that reproductive health
45. Id. at 372.
46. Darroch, supra note 27. For cost- and policy-related reasons why some insurance
companies chooose to limit coverage, see infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
47. Darroch, supra note 27.
48. Linda J. Piccinino & William D. Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the
United States: 1982-1995, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 4, 5; see also Lauran
Neergaard, Birth Control by the Byte?, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/
DailyNews/contraceptives990405.html (Apr. 5, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) ("[S]terilization is the leading American birth control.").
49. Law, supra note 2, at 369.
50. Kathleen A. Bergin, Contraceptive Coverage Under Student Health Insurance
Plans: Title IXas a Remedy for Sex Discrimination, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 157, 175 (2000);
Law, supra note 2, at 370. This fact is unlikely to change in the near future. According to
Dr. David Grimes of the University of North Carolina Medical School, American
scientific advances in the area of contraceptives are becoming a rarity. Heather Maher,
Pregnant Pauses: Small Steps Forward on the Birth Control Front, at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/livingDailyNews/birthcontrol9909 27.html (Sept. 28, 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (quoting Dr. Grimes: "Contraceptive
research and development is really drying up in the U.S. Fifteen or twenty years ago, we
were the undisputed leader in the field, and now we're very much in the backwaters.").
Reasons behind this sudden drop in scientific development include the recent political
apathy surrounding family planning issues and the enormous price tag of products liability
suits. Id. Reversible forms of prescription contraception include the birth control pill,
IUDs, and Norplant. Law, supra note 2, at 369-70; see also Planned Parenthood, Your
Contraceptive Choices, at http://www.plannedparenthood.orgfbirth-control/
contrachoices.htm (Mar. 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing
the effectiveness and side effects of all types of birth control currently available in the
United States).
51. Law, supra note 2, at 374. This particular statistic is frequently cited in support of
mandated insurance coverage for contraception. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6
(1999) (giving findings of the Georgia General Assembly); S. 1200, 106th Cong. § 2(10)
(1999) (listing congressional findings in the as-yet-unenacted Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1999). Professor Law notes a 1994 study
indicating that twice as nany women as men had out-of-pocket expenditures for medical
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care costs account for much of this sixty-eight percent figure.52
In contrast to their coverage of contraception, most health plans
routinely cover pregnancy and certain pregnancy-related costs.53  A
1993 survey of private insurance plans revealed that ninety-seven to
ninety-eight percent of traditional indemnity plans covering one
hundred or more employees typically provided coverage for
childbirth, as did the same percentage of HMOs.5 4 Sixty-six percent
of traditional indemnity plans of the same size also routinely covered
abortion, whereas seventy percent of HMOs did so.5 Ninety percent
of HMOs and similarly-sized traditional indemnity plans paid for
abortion at least under certain circumstances. 6  If increased
contraceptive coverage would decrease the number of pregnancies
and abortions, thereby reducing the money spent on these covered
pregnancy-related benefits,57 and if such savings would be passed on
to consumers in the insurance market, then the refusal of the
insurance industry to provide such coverage is economically irrational
and contrary to the results of a considered cost benefit analysis.51
services exceeding ten percent of their income. Law, supra note 2, at 374-75 (citing
WOMEN'S RESEARCH & EDUC. INST., WOMEN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS AND
EXPERIENCES 6 (1994)).
52. Law, supra note 2, at 375 ("The costs of prescription contraceptives, excluded
from general insurance coverage, account for the largest portion of this disparity." (citing
WOMEN'S RESEARCH & EDUC. INST., WOMEN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS AND
EXPERIENCES 10-11 (1994))); ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, Promoting Access
to Contraception and Opposing Threats to its Availability at Home and Abroad, at
http://www.aclu.orglissues/reproduct/contaccess.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (1998) ("Largely because of the insurance industry's failure to cover
contraceptive supplies and services, women of reproductive age spend approximately 68%
more than men in out-of-pocket health care costs.").
53. Beh, supra note 2, at 161; Darroch, supra note 27. Prior to the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 US.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)), insurers typically did not cover pregnancy because of the
view that pregnancy was a voluntary condition rather than a disease requiring medically
necessary treatment. Beh, supra note 2, at 160-61. The PDA shifted attitudes regarding
pregnancy, making widespread coverage available, even in plans not governed by federal
law. Id. at 161.
54. Darroch, supra note 27.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. This point is the central and as yet unvalidated assumption of the pro-mandate
cost benefit argument. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58. Beh, supra note 2, at 159 ("As a general rule, insurers do not favor preventative
medicine. When it comes to sexual and reproductive health, the preference for
[sterilization] surgery and [sexually-transmitted] disease treatment ignores the cost-savings
and health benefits associated with preventative medicine."); Hayden, supra note 2, at 188
("From a purely economic perspective, providing access to contraceptive coverage for
women is fiscally beneficial for insurance companies. The cost of preventative care is
minimal in comparison to the expense of treatment after the fact, especially in the context
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The potential applicability of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), also
supports mandated contraceptive coverage.59  The PDA prohibits
discrimination based on a woman's intention or potential to become
pregnant.6° Such discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination
because the capacity to bear children is uniquely female.6' Professor
of birth control and pregnancy."). But see Beh, supra note 2, at 138 (summarizing cost-
related arguments typically presented by insurance companies and consumers alike against
mandated insurance coverage).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (including pregnancy-related discrimination in the
category of prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII); Law, supra note 2, at 376-83.
Title VII applies only to employers who have fifteen or more employees for a statutorily-
prescribed period of time. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The sweep of its protections is
accordingly limited to the employees of these "qualified employers." Hayden, supra note
2, at 194. Title VII, like many of the broad state contraceptive coverage mandates, also
has a religious exemption for bona fide religious organizations who choose to discriminate
for religious purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994); see also infra notes 164-73 and
accompanying text (discussion religious exemptions in existing state statutes mandating
contraceptive coverage).
The Supreme Court has held that the PDA's protection against discrimination
based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" extends not only to an
insured under an employer benefit plan, but also to that insured's covered dependents.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1983)
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)). Thus, if inequitable coverage violates the
PDA, employers will have to provide equitable coverage not only to insureds, but also to
their dependents.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
61. Law, supra note 2 at 378. Contra Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 146-47
(1976) (holding that exclusion of pregnancy-related benefits from an insurance plan did
not constitute gender discrimination), congressionally overruled by Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. The Gilbert Court
rationalized this result by explaining that the insurance company was not invidiously
discriminating on the basis of gender, but rather was simply excluding one physical
condition from the list of disabilities that would be compensated. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134
("The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition, pregnancy, from the list of
compensable disabilities."); see also Law, supra note 2, at 375 (discussing Gilbert).
Interestingly, language in the more recent Supreme Court case of Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), might open the door to requiring contraceptive coverage by
employee insurance under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) and in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 ("Reproduction falls well
within the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding
it are central to the life process itself."); Finley, supra note 1, at 866-67 (arguing that the
"sexual dynamics surrounding it" language would seem to allow infertility and impotency
to be classified as disabilities, with birth control discrimination following shortly behind).
Whereas birth control impedes reproduction, Bragdon was concerned with HIV status, a
physical condition that the plaintiff argued restricted her ability to reproduce and bear
children. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. Thus, the analogy is not perfect.
At least in terms of the ADA, then, this difference between impeding and
enhancing reproduction might prove crucial to the distinction between Viagra and birth
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Law argues that because discrimination based on a woman's desire to
avoid the personal physical experience of pregnancy is likewise
gender-specific, the PDA's provisions also should extend to issues
such as inequitable contraceptive coverage in the insurance industry.62
In other words, women alone suffer the physical consequences of
pregnancy, and so are disproportionately saddled not only with the
risks of pregnancy, but also with the costs associated with avoiding
those risks-the costs of most types of reversible contraception.63
According to Professor Law, courts should hold that such a
disproportionate, gender-based burden violates the PDA.'
Professor Law is not alone in this belief. In June 1999, sixty
women's groups requested that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) instruct employers that excluding
contraceptives from health plan coverage constitutes sex
discrimination.65  Although the EEOC's "policy guidance" on this
control. Viagra would be covered because male impotency is a disability inhibiting
reproduction, but birth control would not, because its function seeks to inhibit pregnancy.
Significantly, however, male impotency frequently results from physical conditions related
to aging and the deterioration in health that goes with it. Causes and Treatment for Male
Impotence, at http://www.andrology.com/main0l.htm (last updated Nov. 2000) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (listing causes of "secondary impotence," which sets
in after years of normal sex, as including diabetes mellitus, hypertension, atherosclerosis,
kidney failure, heart disease, stroke, and Parkinson's disease). Most men using Viagra
therefore are not typically in their prime reproductive years. Bob Dole and Hugh Hefner,
for example, probably are not enthusiastic users and proponents of the drug because they
want to hear the pitter-patter of little feet. See Finley, supra note 1, at 838 n.6 (noting
Hefner's statement that Viagra was "the greatest recreational drug ever" (emphasis
added)). If Viagra is not being taken for procreative purposes, it should not constitute a
required accommodation for a disability under the Bragdon decision.
62. Law, supra note 2, at 382-83 ("The current state of technology permits
prescription contraceptives only for women. Thus, when an employer covers all
prescription drugs except for contraception, the discrimination against women is
explicit."); see also Bergin, supra note 50, at 175 ("[A]ll medically prescribed reversible
contraceptive methods are used solely by women. Thus, women alone shoulder both the
responsibility and the risks associated with obtaining and utilizing reversible
contraception."); Hayden, supra note 2, at 182 ("By virtue of being female, women alone
are faced with the risk of pregnancy every time they engage in sexual intercourse without
effective contraception."); Fahrenthold, supra note 1 (quoting Gloria Feldt, President of
Planned Parenthood Federation of America: "Singling women out for less than complete
health coverage forces them to use their own money or face getting pregnant-and that's a
woman-only issue."). Professor Law also notes that the EEOC interprets the PDA to
prohibit discrimination against women who have had abortions. Law, supra note 2, at 381
(citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 app. (1997)).
63. See, e.g., Bergin, supra note 50, at 175.
64. Law, supra note 2, at 381-83.
65. Laura Meckier, Women's Groups Ask EEOC to Force Coverage of Birth Control,
CH. TRIB., July 7, 1999, § 8, at 8; Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, June 11, 1999, at A5.
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subject is not legally binding on employers,66 it likely will influence
employers, as well as bolster the merits of any lawsuit brought under
such a claim.67 The EEOC in fact recently issued a Commission
Decision' finding that a certain employer health plan violated the
PDA when it excluded prescription contraceptive drugs from
coverage while covering a number of comparable preventive drugs
and services, as well as Viagra.69 The EEOC based its decision at
least in part on the idea that this kind of insurance coverage exclusion
necessarily constitutes sex discrimination because only women are
affected-prescription contraceptives are currently available only for
female use.70 Although the EEOC emphasized that an employer is
not required to make contraceptives available to employees through
insurance, it noted that the employer could not choose to provide
coverage for comparable treatments and medications but exclude
contraceptives from coverage.7'
The first lawsuit addressing whether employers can exclude
contraceptives from coverage was filed on July 19, 2000, by a group of
female employees in Seattle.7 2 Pharmacist Jennifer EricksonP3 heads
66. Meckler, supra note 65.
67. Professor Law speculated in her 1998 article that no one had brought a Title VII
challenge to inequitable insurance provisions for several reasons including the difficulty of
getting specific coverage information from providers, the limited number of attorneys who
would be willing to take on the financial risk that would accompany such a claim, and the
insignificance of recovered expenditures when compared to the time and expense of a
legal battle. Law, supra note 2, at 388-89. Since the publication of Law's article, however,
a class action lawsuit involving a Title VII challenge to inequitable insurance provisions
has been filed in Seattle. Class Action Filed Against Employer Excluding Contraceptives
from Benefits, ANDREWS EMPL. LIT. REP., Aug. 22, 2000, at 6, 6, WL 14 No. 19
ANEMPLR 6 [hereinafter Class Action Filed]; infra notes 71-80.
68. This type of EEOC decision is "a formal Commission determination as to whether
there is reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred with respect
to a specific charge or charges." U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC
Issues Decision on Two Charges Challenging the Denial of Health Insurance Coverage for
Prescription Contraceptives, at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/press/12-13-OO.html (Dec. 13, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
69. Id
70. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Questions and Answers:
Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/qanda-
decision-contraception.html (last modified Dec. 14, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) ("Because prescription contraceptives are available only for women, 100
percent of those affected by the exclusion are women. This, by definition, constitutes sex-
discrimination.").
71. Id
72. Class Action Filed, supra note 67.
73. Erickson has been called an ideal "poster plaintiff" for this issue because she is
married, has yet to have children, and is even a pharmacist. Goodman, supra note 1. She
spends three hundred dollars of her own money each year to purchase contraceptives. Id;
Fahrenthold, supra note 1. The Bartell Drug Company plan that excludes Ms. Erickson's
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this class action against her employer, Bartell Drug Company, under
the theory that its exclusion of contraceptives from two self-insured 74
health plans violates Title VI. 5 Ms. Erickson and the other plaintiffs
allege that their company's failure to provide coverage for
contraceptives has a disparate impact on female employees. 76 They
further allege that no business necessity justifies this coverage
exclusion. 7
Because the two plans in the Erickson lawsuit are self-insured,
ordinary state mandates requiring contraceptive coverage cannot
reach them.78 Self-insured plans are instead regulated by ERISA, 79 a
comprehensive federal act that preempts state law to the extent it
relates to employee benefit plans." A finding by the Seattle district
birth control pills from coverage also excludes Viagra, infertility drugs, weight loss drugs,
and immunization agents. Bernard McGhee, Paying for the Pill, at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/birthcontrolcoverage0719.html (July 19,
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Despite these exclusions, the plan
apparently covers a number of other preventive medical services and prescriptions,
including birth control pills prescribed for medical conditions unrelated to contraception.
Class Action Filed, supra note 67; McGhee, supra. For Erickson's story in her own words,
see Jennifer Erickson, I'm Tired of Paying Big Bucks for Birth Control, SELF, Oct. 2000, at
142, 142).
74. Self-insured plans are those plans funded directly by employers. Beh, supra note
2, at 139-40. As opposed to group plans purchased by employers from independent
insurance companies, under self-insured plans, companies pay claims from a reserve of
company money. Id.; Fahrenthold, supra note 1. Because self-insuring employers are not
considered to be engaged in the insurance industry under ERISA, ERISA rather than
state law governs their plans. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
75. Class Action Filed, supra note 67, at 6; Fahrenthold, supra note 1; Goodman, supra
note 1; McGhee, supra note 73. Ms. Erickson and others have the support of Planned
Parenthood. Fahrenthold, supra note 1.
76. Class Action Filed, supra note 67, at 6.
77. Id. (noting the plaintiffs' position that the exclusion of contraceptives from
coverage is unjustifiable because it was not "job-related [or] ... consistent with business
necessity); see also Hayden, supra note 2, at 185 ("[A]n employer's insurance policy may
not adversely impact women disproportionately compared to men unless the employer
demonstrates a 'business necessity'....").
78. Fahrenthold, supra note 1 ("Under a 1974 federal statute, self-insured companies
... are exempt from state insurance laws."); supra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing ERISA's preemption of state law with respect to self-insured plans); infra note
85 and accompanying text (same). The state of Washington has yet to pass a law
addressing contraceptive coverage. NCSL, Women's Health, supra note 1.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994).
80. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,733 (1985) ("Section 514(a) of
ERISA broadly pre-empts state laws that relate to an employee-benefit plan ... ."); Beh,
supra note 2, at 138 ("ERISA contains a preemption clause which dilutes the ability of
states to mandate specific insurance coverage insured under some ERISA plans."). The
majority of Americans have ERISA-qualified health insurance. Beh, supra note 2, at 138
& n.118 (citing figures from the Health Insurance Association of America, which reveal
that "32% of small employers ... [and] 85% of large employers (25 employees or more)
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court that the self-insured plans' provisions violate the PDA,
however, might allow state agents to enforce compliance with Title
VII.81 Forcing self-insured plans to comply with Title VII by
eliminating insurance coverage inequity would create the same result
via federal law that would have been reached had a state mandate
been applicable.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts," the United
States Supreme Court held that state mandates regarding health care
benefits in non-self-funded insurance policies are not preempted by
ERISA.83 The Court's decision relied in large part on the plain
language of ERISA's "insurance savings clause," which states that
"law[s] of any State which regulate[] insurance, banking, or
securities ' '84 are exempted from ERISA's larger blanket of
preemption.85 The Court was influenced further by the fact that state
regulation of the substantive provisions of insurance plans-
mandated benefit laws being just one of the more recent examples-
predated ERISA legislation; mandated benefits, therefore, could not
be easily dismissed as non-traditional insurance laws that ERISA
should preempt.8 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that the state law at
offer health benefits, and 77% of employees work in firms making health benefits
available."); Bergin, supra note 50, at 163 ("While twenty-five million people obtain
medical coverage through independent private policies, the vast majority-just over 165
million-finance health care costs by participating in employer-sponsored group health
plans."). ERISA, however, does not expressly protect employees from discriminatory
health care plans. Finley, supra note 1, at 869. ERISA's protections are only triggered
when an employer retaliates against a health plan participant for exercising her rights
under that plan, when an employer interferes with a health plan participant's use of the
plan, or when the health plan participant is wrongfully denied benefits under her plan. 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (1994); Finley, supra note 1, at 869.
81. Law, supra note 2, at 397-98 (interpreting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983), as a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that ERISA could not prevent
Title VII from being enforced by state authorities).
82. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
83. Id at 744.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
85. "Self-insured" plans themselves are excepted from this general exception under
the "deemer clause." Id. Because the "deemer clause" provides that no employee-benefit
plan, with certain exceptions, shall be considered to be an insurance company or to be
engaged in the insurance business, see id-, the "insurance savings clause" allowing state law
regulation of the insurance and banking industry does not apply to employers who insure
themselves. Beh, supra note 2, at 139-40. ERISA, therefore, still preempts state law with
regard to self-insured plans, and state mandated benefits thus do not apply to them. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); cf. Beh, supra note 2, at 139 ("Thus, the more onerous state
mandates become, the more attractive self-insuring health plans become to employers who
are able to self-insure.").
86. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 742. This factor is important because states
historically have enjoyed broad regulatory powers concerning the substantive terms of
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issue displaced no specific provision of ERISA because ERISA did
not "regulate the substantive content of welfare-benefit plans."'
Because the ERISA exception that allows state regulation of
insurance, banking, and securities does not reach self-insured
employers,"8 employees with self-insured plans can only hope for
mandated coverage through favorable judicial construction of the
PDA89 or from federal law mandating such benefits.9° The Equity in
Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC),91 a
proposed amendment to ERISA, is an example of this kind of federal
legislation. Introduced and rejected in both 1997 and 1999,1 the bill
was recently reintroduced in the Senate and now sits in committee
with little prospect of success.93
insurance contracts. Id. at 728-29. The Court rejected the argument that because state
mandated benefit statutes were a recent phenomenon, they should be preempted by
ERISA's "insurance savings clause." See id. at 742 ("[lIt is both historically and
conceptually inaccurate to assert that mandated-benefit laws are not traditional insurance
laws. As we have indicated, state laws regulating the substantive terms of insurance
contracts were commonplace well before the mid-70's, when Congress considered
ERISA.").
87. Id. at 732 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)).
88. See supra notes 74, 84.
89. Supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
90. Beh, supra note 2, at 139-40 (stating that federal mandates will be necessary to
reach self-insured employee benefit plans); Hayden, supra note 2, at 192 (advocating
federal intervention to achieve contraceptive coverage for all women).
91. S. 104, 107th Cong. (2001). EPICC would amend ERISA by adding a provision
setting standards relating to benefits for contraceptives. See id. Although state
contraceptive coverage mandates meet the Metropolitan Life requirement of falling into
the non-preemption area of insurance regulation, EPICC, because of its substantively
regulatory content, could preempt such mandates. One of the factors the Metropolitan
Life Court considered in making its decision was the fact that ERISA did not substantively
regulate the content of insurance plans. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 742. If passed,
EPICC would. EPICC therefore might replace any state benefit mandates in existence at
the time of its enactment. Unfortunately, EPICC's enactment is unlikely. Infra note 92
and accompanying text.
92. The Senate bill was first introduced on May 14, 1997 by United States Senator
Olympia Snowe. S. 743, 105th Cong. (1997). United States Representative James
Greenwood introduced a similar bill into the House of Representatives on July 16, 1997.
H.R. 2174, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Cost of Adding Contraceptive Coverage to Health
Plans Minimal, WOMEN's HEALTH WKLY., Sept. 28, 1998, at 9, 9-10 (noting the
respective dates on which EPICC was introduced into the Senate and the House of
Representatives). For identical bills introduced in subsequent Congresses, see S. 104,
107th Cong. (2001); S. 1200, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2120,106th Cong. (1999).
93. See Baker, supra note 2, at 37 ("[T]he proposed federal Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act was introduced more than a year ago and has
yet to get a committee hearing. Few expect one anytime soon."); Christine Ianzito, Get
Your Pills Paid For, SELF, Oct. 2000, at 145, 145 ("Urge your senators and representatives
to support the federal Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act,
which has been floating around in legislative never-never land for years."). Despite the
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Thus, three fundamental arguments buttress state-mandated
contraceptive coverage. First, a cost-benefit analysis supports state
mandates insofar as its basic assumption of a decrease in unintended
pregnancies and a corresponding absorption of increased
contraceptive coverage costs is correct.94 Second, should courts hold
that the PDA encompasses inequities in contraceptive coverage, state
mandates will aid in meeting the states' responsibility to enforce Title
VIIY5 Third, except as to self-insured plans, ERISA does not
preempt the states' power to mandate benefits.96 Until Congress
passes a federal mandate such as EPICC, states may require
contraceptive coverage in non-self-funded plans without running into
conflict with a federal provision.97
Not only the insurance industry, but also consumer laypersons-
who obviously want their rights protected-have raised multi-faceted
objections to and arguments against mandated insurance benefits.
Among the most prominent arguments are the "medically
necessary"/"quality-of-life" treatment distinction, the related issue of
"moral hazard,"98 and the relative rigidity of having insurance
contracts written by legislative bodies rather than by market forces.99
The contention that overall initial cost increases in insurance plans
leave more people uninsured is also not to be ignored. 1°°
The advent of Viagra brought the "medically
necessary"/"quality-of-life" treatment distinction into the spotlight.
The insurance industry traditionally has denied coverage for
procedures or medications viewed as elective or cosmetic and not
difficulty in getting this broader act passed, Congress did pass a law ensuring contraceptive
coverage for federal employees. Omnibus Consolidated & Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681; Stephanie Barr, Birth
Control, Not Money, Was Key in One Budget Battle, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1998, at A19.
Given the "anti-abortion sentiment that runs through the Republican-controlled
Congress," supporters of mandated contraceptive coverage viewed this congressional
action as a significant step. Superville, supra note 2.
94. See supra notes 26-58 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 59-77, 81 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
98. "Moral hazard" is defined as "the possibility of loss to an insurance company
arising from the character, habits, or circumstances of the insured." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1469 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993). Coverage of
lung cancer treatment, for example, arguably leads to the "moral hazard" of increased
smoking among insureds. See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75
TEx. L. REv. 237, 237 (1996) ("What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the
consequences of bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior.").
99. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 28.
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medically required-so-called "quality-of-life" treatments. 1 1 Based
on this distinction, Kaiser Permanente and Aetna U.S. Healthcare
refused to provide coverage for Viagra under their policies because of
their view that Viagra was more of a "quality of life" or
"recreational" drug rather than one prescribed for a bona fide
physical problem.102 Kaiser maintained that its coverage for the
evaluation and treatment of sexual dysfunction would remain
unaffected.1 3 When some insurance companies began to cover
101. Health insurance companies have been denying coverage for the birth control pill
since its invention almost forty years ago because they classify it as a "lifestyle drug," not a
"medical necessity." Hayden, supra note 2, at 182 ("For years, insurance companies have
excluded some if not all forms of contraceptives based on the determination that
prescription birth control is not a "medical necessity."); Finley, supra note 1, at 840 ("Most
private insurers have denied coverage for the birth control pill since its inception almost
forty years ago. Insurers call the only prescription contraceptive in pill form, which is only
for women, a 'lifestyle drug.' "); Goodman, supra note 1 ("Many [employers faced with
questions of insurance] have described [birth control] pills and diaphragms as a 'lifestyle
choice' on par with Retin-A or cosmetic surgery or-as one California legislator put it-
'hairspray.' "). Courts divide on the question of whether or not infertility treatments are
"medically necessary" as that term is used in the insurance industry. Finley, supra note 1,
at 851-52 (noting that this conflict might have been resolved by the Supreme Court
decision of Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), a case which could be construed as
classifying infertility as a "disability" that must be accommodated by employer-provided
insurance under the ADA). At least two courts have found that bone marrow transplants
are not medically necessary. Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 661 (8th
Cir. 1992); Grethe v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 881 F. Supp. 1160, 1166-67 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see
also Finley, supra note 1, at 850-52 (discussing Farley and Grethe). Several treatments
that appear to straddle the border between "quality of life" and "medical necessity" are
covered by the majority of insurance policies--e.g., blood pressure medications, allergy
prescriptions, and immunizations. Hayden, supra note 2, at 184.
102. Beh, supra note 2, at 119-20. Viagra in fact does nothing to "cure" either
impotency or erectile dysfunction. LARRY KATZENSTEIN, VIAGRA: THE POTENCY
PROMISE 7, 71 (1998); Hayden, supra note 2, at 181; Finley, supra note 1, at 844. Viagra
only alleviates the symptoms of impotency or erectile dysfunction by allowing sexual
function to resume temporarily. KATZENSTEIN, supra, at 7, 71; Finley, supra note 1, at
844-45; Hayden, supra note 2, at 181.
103. Beh, supra note 2, at 144. This seemingly illogical line-drawing appears to stem
from the fear that Viagra would be used not just to correct impotency, but to recapture the
sexual vigor of youth in men unaffected by clinical impotency. See Postrel, supra note 2, at
121 ("Viagra may have been created to treat specific, disease-related conditions, such as
the effects of prostate cancer or diabetes. But to some men, a truly 'healthy' condition is
what's normal for a 17-year-old. They want Viagra to restore their youth."); see also
Discovery Health, Anti-Impotence Pill Raises Specter of Abuse, at
http:llwww.discoveryhealth.comDHlihtIHIWSDSCOOOI9105/8316/184523.html?d=dmtCon
tent (last updated May 4, 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("Reports
of... men queu[ing] up to fill 40,000 prescriptions a day of the anti-impotence pill Viagra
... raise concerns that not all these men may be suffering from erectile dysfunction ...
[but] [r]ather... merely may be seeking to improve their sexual prowess."). Faced with a
price tag of roughly ten dollars for each Viagra pill, see Insurers Accused of Gender Bias
Over Coverage of Viagra, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), May 13, 1998, at
11A, 1998 WL 6352946, Kaiser and others balked at the potential cost of "recreational"
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Viagra, various women's groups and medical associations raised the
fairly compelling, if imperfect, parallel of Viagra to contraceptives."°4
The insurance companies covering Viagra also responded with the
"medically necessary"/"quality of life" distinction, this time
characterizing Viagra as medically necessary and contraceptives as
life-enhancing. 0 5
The fact that both the insurers that provided coverage for Viagra
and those that did not used the same treatment-distinguishing
overuse. These concerns are not unfounded; after Viagra was introduced in April 1998,
doctors were writing more than 300,000 prescriptions a week by mid-May. Finley, supra
note 1, at 837. In contrast, birth control pills cost eighty-two cents per pill. Ianzito, supra
note 93, at 145.
104. See Goldberg, supra note 2 ("Viagra, which counteracts impotence, is not an exact
logical parallel to pills or devices that counteract conception. But it was close enough to
be used that way by lawmakers who saw their moment and jumped at it ... ."); Hayden,
supra note 2, at 181 (arguing that, like Viagra, contraceptives do not cure any condition
but allow individuals to enjoy and control their sexuality in a relatively unencumbered
fashion); id. at 183 (pointing to an assertion by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists that reasonable access to effective contraception improves health of both
mothers and infants). Intuitively, birth control seems more "medically necessary" than
Viagra because contraception eliminates not only an individual's potential physical burden
of pregnancy, but the potential burden on society of an unwanted child as well. Finley,
supra note 1, at 867-68 (comparing the medical "need" for an erection with the medical
"need" to avoid pregnancy).
105. See Postrel, supra note 2, at 121 (noting Reverend Joseph E. Looney's remarks
before the Connecticut legislature considering mandating contraceptive coverage that
contraception was "disgusting and demoralizing," whereas Viagra "enhance[d] a natural
function"); see also, e.g., Brutlag, supra note 2 (quoting Chris Hamrick, spokesman for the
Illinois Association of HMOs, an organization representing twenty-six HMOs in that state:
"Viagra treats a medical condition, whereas contraception is more of a therapeutic
prescription"); cf Stacey Bums, Legislature 1999: Bill Requires Coverage for
Contraceptives, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Mar. 10, 1999, at Bi (quoting Senator
Georgia Gardner as saying of the contraceptive mandate proposal, "[tihis bill isn't about
sex. What it's about is medical coverage for medical conditions.").
Although Medicaid does not cover "quality of life" medications such as weight
loss drugs, Finley, supra note 1, at 870-71, the federal government regards both
contraceptives and Viagra as "medical necessities," at least in terms of Medicaid coverage.
Since a 1972 amendment to the Medicaid statute, the federal government mandates that
states cover all medically approved contraceptive devices, supplies, and related care under
Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1994); Bergin, supra note 50, at 168; Hayden, supra
note 2, at 196. Medicaid likewise covers Viagra. Finley, supra note 1, at 839 ("Even
Medicaid, the government's medical insurance program for the poor, jumped on the
bandwagon and mandated states pay for the [Viagra] prescription pill because it did not
fall within the exceptions to deny coverage."); AFI Health Comm. Reports, Medicaid
Coverage of Viagra, available at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/rprt0798.htm (July 1998) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("The HCFA [Health Care Financing
Administration] letter indicates that states are required to provide coverage for Viagra
under the provisions of the Medicaid drug rebate program established in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 .... "). In fact, the Department of Defense recently
received fifty million dollars for Viagra use by male military personnel and veterans.
Finley, supra note 1, at 847.
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categories to reach completely opposite conclusions illustrates how
nebulous the term "quality of life" is.1°6 The argument could be made
that impotence is a "natural" result of the progression into old age,
just as bearing children is a "natural" result of the progression into
womanhood."° Under this view, both Viagra and contraceptives are
only quality-of-life "enhancers" that avoid natural bodily
consequences. They are not, under this view, drugs that combat
abnormal medical conditions. 08  If both are quality of life
"enhancers" rather than "medical necessities," neither should be
covered. If, however, sexual function is a component of health, both
Viagra and contraceptives should be covered. As medical advances
increase lifespans and as newfound health care innovations are
geared more toward the "quality" of these longer lives, the quality-of-
life distinction will become more tenuous.'°9 Such distinctions are
likely to become more arbitrary and more susceptible to being
informed by political and moral judgments rather than by objective
medical justifications." 0 Insurance companies thus should abandon
such distinctions.
As a corollary to this troublesome distinction, the insurance
industry also hesitates to cover what it considers "recreational" or
"life enhancing" treatments because of the possible moral hazard of
106. Although blood pressure medication, allergy prescriptions, and immunization
shots do not cure physical ailments, they are nonetheless covered by most insurance
policies. Hayden, supra note 2, at 184.
107. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 102, at 13 ("Impotence ... becomes increasingly
prevalent with age); Beh, supra note 2, at 165 (noting that once a woman reaches
reproductive age, assuming sexual activity and ordinary levels of fertility, she must spend
an average of 20.5 years of her life trying to avoid pregnancy through some method of
contraception).
108. See Postrel, supra note 2, at 121.
109. See Finley, supra note 1, at 844 (quoting one bioethicist: "lit is important that we
protect our access to drugs and treatments that improve our health by protecting normal
functions. The key will be determining what counts as normal ... [and] Viagra represents
only the beginning of ... difficult decisions about who pays for the promising treatments
of the future."); id. at 871 ("The future holds a number of new drugs that will not be easily
classified into the neat categories of medically necessary vs. lifestyle or even experimental
drugs."); Postrel, supra note 2, at 121 (" 'Enhancement,' which goes beyond merely curing
disease, is the next great medical frontier [and presents a] slippery issued illustrated well
by Viagra.").
110. The problem is determining what should be used instead to draw the line between
compensable treatments and non-compensable ones. One commentator warns that giving
only Viagra the insurance-covered status of "medical necessity" could lead to a "fiscal
nightmare," especially if the drug is approved for use in women. Finley, supra note 1, at
870. If the floodgate of coverage is opened by Viagra or contraceptives, weight loss
medications and baldness treatments-"lifestyle" drugs currently exempted from
insurance plans-might follow quickly behind. Id. at 870-71.
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overuse."' Where insurance companies consider an activity, such as
sexual activity, to be "largely voluntary.., and controllable, ' 11 2 they
generally refuse to provide coverage for the risks generated by such
activity out of fear that doing so will cause insureds to engage in that
risk-creating activity.13  Professor Hazel Glenn Beh suggests that
anticipation of potential overuse explains why insurance companies
frequently balk at covering both contraceptives and Viagra."4  She
nevertheless contends that the looming threat of overuse is somewhat
overstated." 5 Demand for these kinds of health care services is kept
in check by already present external considerations." 6  Moreover,
insurance companies themselves could provide more extensive
controls as a matter of treatment-access gate-keeping."17
The "moral hazard" concept is a problematic method of setting
limits on coverage because insurance companies cover treatments for
a large variety of physical conditions that arguably result from
"voluntary" activity."' Moreover, at least as far as contraceptive
coverage is concerned, the "moral hazard" argument seems
unavailable to insurance companies that already cover the costs of
abortion, pregnancy, and sexually transmitted disease-all of which
result from voluntary sexual activity. Like the distinction between
treatments that are "medically necessary" and those that only
improve the "quality of life," the concept of moral hazard has the
111. Beb, supra note 2, at 125-32. For a comprehensive discussion of the subject of
"moral hazard," see generally Baker, supra note 98.
112. Beh, supra note 2, at 126.
113. Id. at 128.
114. Id. ("Insurers fear that desperate infertile couples might over-utilize assisted
reproductive technologies despite low success rates simply because an insurer is paying the
cost."); see also John Hendren, Impotence Pill Coverage Eyed: Insurers are Wondering
How Much Sex is Enough, CIE. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at 3 ("With Viagra becoming
the hottest drug on the market, health insurers are demanding proof from doctors that
their patients need the impotency pill and are not just looking to spice up their sex lives.").
115. Beh, supra note 2, at 128-29.
116. Id. at 129. External considerations limiting demand include the physical and
sometimes life-altering consequences of a treatment decision, the treatment's physical and
psychological toll, and the treating physician's counsel. Id.
117. Id. As part of her discussion of insurance coverage of Viagra, Professor Hazel
Glenn Beh lists some possible external controls that insurance companies could impose to
avoid the abuse of over-consumption. See id. at 146-47. These controls include definitive
diagnosis and documentation, limiting coverage when the cause of the problem is not
organic or caused by some "voluntary" activity (such as, in the case of impotence,
alcoholism or substance abuse), and limiting the quantity of pills prescribed. See id.
118. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 70 (noting
that the insurance plan at issue covered a number of "preventive" medicinal treatments,
including vaccinations, blood pressure and cholesterol control treatments, weight loss
drugs, and dental care, as well as surgical sterilization and Viagra).
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capacity for arbitrary application by the insurance industry and
therefore is not as useful a line-drawing mechanism as a cost benefit
analysis.
Some proponents of contraceptive coverage, however, contend
that legislative action, whether at the state or federal level, is not the
best vehicle for reform.119 Individuals otherwise favoring mandates
are concerned about the rigidity of legislation and the over-
politicization of certain morally charged issues such as those
concerning reproductive rights.' Likewise objecting to legislative
action, insurance companies maintain that the free market best
regulates the content of insurance benefit plans.2 1 Both views have
enjoyed some success. Despite the general tendency of female
legislators faced with the subject of contraceptive coverage to join
forces across party lines,'2 passage of state law contraceptive
mandates has not been overwhelmingly successful." Although some
legislative failure can be explained by the minority presence of
women in state legislatures, a contraceptive coverage mandate
nevertheless struggled, and was still pending in February, 2000, in the
Washington State Legislature with the highest proportion of women
in American history. 24 The failure of this kind of legislation perhaps
119. Beh, supra note 2, at 121 ("[B]ecause of the moral and political nature of
sexuality, legislation is not a particularly appealing method of achieving a better insurance
contract. For example, women's health may be compromised by legislative restrictions on
reproductive health care choices. Neither insurers nor insureds should want Congress to
write our insurance contracts."); Postrel, supra note 2, at 121 (contending that legislatures
subject insurance contracts to inflexible standards reflecting the personal and political
values of the moment).
120. Beh, supra note 2, at 121; see also Postrel, supra note 2, at 121 ("Both the pill and
Viagra are about sex, of course, which makes them good for headline-hungry
politicians.").
121. Brutlag, supra note 2 (referencing UnitedHealthcare Illinois' corporate policy of
opposing state law insurance coverage mandates). One company spokeswoman explained
the prevailing industry view by stating, "[w]e believe that the marketplace appropriately
addresses what should and should not be covered under health plans." Id
122. Goldberg, supra note 2. For an excellent discussion of the roles played by female
legislators across the country, see Penny M. Miller, Staking Their Claim: The Impact of
Kentucky Women in the Political Process, 84 Ky. L.J. 1163, 1184-86 (1995-96). According
to Professor Miller, "[f]emale legislators are reported to be more liberal than men, even
when controlling for party membership and female state legislators are more concerned
with feminist issues than their male colleagues." Id at 1189.
123. Lerner, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that as of the date of her piece, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and West
Virginia had all rejected contraceptive coverage mandate legislation). For more up-to-
date information, see NARAL Resources, supra note 6 (providing a chart listing state
contraceptive coverage requirements).
124. Goldberg, supra note 2; Wash. State Legislature, History of SB 5512, at
http:lwww.leg.wa.gov/publbillinfo/1999-00/senate/5500-55245512_history.txt (Feb. 25,
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indicates that these women, while concerned with contraceptive
related issues, would rather deal with insurance companies on a more
private, non-legislative level. Insurance contracts have the perpetual
possibility of being renegotiated, whereas changes in laws are not
achieved so fluidly.
The primary arguments against contraceptive coverage mandates
therefore involve a reduced pool of insureds because of the increased
cost of coverage, the coverage-limiting distinction between "medically
necessary" and "quality of life," the somewhat inseparable issue of
the threat of moral hazard,'25 and the inflexibility and subjective
values inherent in the enactment of legislative measures.'2 The first
and last of these concerns are the most compelling; unlike the others,
they do not involve gray-area concepts that are subject, by virtue of
their very malleability, to manipulation by large insurance companies
or politicians to suit particular agendas.
Turning to North Carolina's contraceptive coverage mandate,
the statute provides that, subject to a specific religious employer
exemption, 28 "every insurer providing a health benefit plan that
provides coverage for prescription drugs or devices shall provide
coverage for prescription contraceptive drugs or devices.'' 29
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Women comprise forty-eight percent
of the Washington Legislature, compared with an average of 22.3% in other state
legislatures. Goldberg, supra note 2. Boding less well for federal initiatives such as
EPICC, however, women make up only 12.1% of the United States Congress, and
congressional party lines tend to be harder to cross. Id; supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text. A successful non-partisan effort by female representatives is,
therefore, even less likely at the congressional level.
125. See supra notes 98, 101-18 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (1999). Under the statute, a religious employer
meeting certain requirements may request that contraceptives-related coverage not be
provided because the coverage conflicts with the employer's religious beliefs. Id The
religious objector must (1) be exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code; (2) organized and operated for religious purposes, with a central function of
instilling religious values; and (3) mainly employ people of the same religious beliefs.
§ 58-3-178(e)(1)-(3). If a religious employer requests an insurer not to provide coverage,
the insurer must provide written notice to every person who would be affected by this
modification under the plan. § 58-3-178(e). The notice must be posted in at least ten
point type in the health benefit plan, the plan's application, and the sales brochure. Id. If
the objectionable drugs or devices are not prescribed for contraceptive purposes, but
rather for some other medical reason, coverage for these drugs or devices may not be
excluded from a plan, regardless of any applicable religious employer exemption. Id.
Relatedly, coverage may not be refused under this exemption if prescription contraception
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the insured. Id.
129. § 58-3-178(a) (emphasis added). The term "health benefit plan" encompasses, to
the extent allowable by exceptions to ERISA or by a waiver, "an accident and health
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"Insurers" under the statute include insurance companies, service
corporations, HMOs, and multiple employer welfare arrangements-
all as organized and defined under applicable provisions of North
Carolina law.13 "Prescription contraceptive drugs or devices," with
two explicit exceptions, include pregnancy-preventing drugs and
devices approved by the FDA and prescribed by an authorized health
care provider.'3 ' The statute allows any insurer to apply the same co-
insurance, deductibles, or other limitations to contraceptive drugs or
devices that it applies to other prescription drugs or devices under a
given plan. 32 Moreover, the statute forbids insurers from providing
incentives or penalties to affect either the use of the covered
contraceptives by an insured or the contraception-associated services
or prescriptions made available by a health care professional. 33
The North Carolina mandate also requires insurers furnishing
health care professional outpatient services under any given plan to
provide for any outpatient services associated with contraceptive
use. 34 These services include, for example, the trip to a physician to
have a diaphragm fitted. Again, as with contraceptive methods and
their non-contraceptive counterparts, insurers may apply the same co-
insurance, deductibles, or other limitations that they apply to other
insurance policy or certificate; a nonprofit hospital or medical service corporation
contract; a health maintenance organization contract; a plan provided by a multiple
employer welfare arrangement," or some other kind of benefit arrangement. § 58-3-
178(c)(1). Some kinds of insurance are specifically excluded from this definition. See
§ 58-3-178(c)(1)(a)-(m) (excluding various types of more limited policies, including
Medicare supplement, worker's compensation, and short-term limited duration policies).
130. § 58-3-178(c)(2).
131. § 58-3-178(c)(4). The FDA-approved contraceptive drugs that are nevertheless
excepted from the statute are RU-486 (the so-called "abortion pill") and Preven (the so-
called "morning after" pill). § 58-3-178(c)(4)(a)-(b).
The FDA has also approved another version of the "morning after" pill,
levonorgestrel. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for
Use as Postcoital Emergency Contraception, 60 Fed. Reg. 8610, 8611-12 (Feb. 25, 1997);
Maher, supra note 50 (discussing development and benefits of this "better tolerated, more
effective emergency contraception pill"). Levonorgestrel causes far fewer side effects than
Preven, particularly in terms of nausea, dizziness, vomiting, and headaches. Maher, supra
note 50. This new drug probably would still be excepted from the North Carolina
contraceptive mandate as an "equivalent drug product" to Preven. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-3-178(c)(4)(b) (1999) (excepting "[t]he prescription drug marketed under the name
'Preven' or any 'equivalent drug product' as defined in G.S. 90-85.27(1)"). Section 58-3-




134. § 58-3-178(b). Outpatient contraceptive services are defined as "consultations,
examinations, procedures, and medical services provided on an outpatient basis and
related to the use of contraceptive methods to prevent pregnancy." § 58-3-178(c)(3).
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outpatient services to contraception-associated outpatient services.'
If a plan does not provide outpatient services, but does cover
prescription drugs or devices, North Carolina law also requires
coverage for any medical examination or procedure associated with
the use of the prescribed contraceptive drug or device.
36
The eight states mandating broad contraceptive coverage 3 7 differ
slightly in their statutory language indicating which insurance plans
are affected.' s For example, Maine and Nevada use separate
statutory provisions to address different kinds of plans. 39 California,
unlike North Carolina which specifically excludes "disability income"
135. § 58-3-178(b).
136. § 58-3-178(a).
137. See supra note 9 (listing the seven mandates other than North Carolina's).
138. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a) (West 2000) (mandating that
"[e]very group [and individual] health care service plan contract, except for... specialized
health care service plan contract[s]" that covers "outpatient prescription drug benefits"
include FDA-approved contraceptive methods); 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(a), 2(a) (Reg.
Sess.) (requiring "each individual health insurance policy" and "each group health
insurance policy" covering outpatient prescription drugs to include coverage for FDA-
approved contraceptive methods); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(b)(1) (Supp. 2000)
(requiring "any individual or group plan, policy, or contract for health care services" to
include coverage for any FDA-approved contraceptives); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2332-J (West 2000) (mandating that all types of general insurance contracts that include
coverage for prescription drugs, devices, or outpatient services not exclude FDA-approved
contraceptive drugs and devices, or related outpatient services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, §§ 2756, 2847-G, 4247 (West 2000) (same); MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 15-826 (Supp.
2000) (requiring insurers, nonprofit health service plans, and IMOs covering prescription
drugs to cover any contraceptive drug or device approved by the FDA); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 689A.0415, 689A.0417, 689B.0377 (Michie Supp. 1999) (requiring that "an insurer
that offers or issues a policy of health insurance" providing prescription drug or device
coverage or outpatient services not exclude contraceptive drugs, devices, or contraceptive-
related outpatient services); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-i, 420-A:17-c, 420-B:8-gg
(Supp. 1999) (mandating coverage of outpatient contraceptive services for FDA-approved
pregnancy-prevention methods by governing health service corporations, HMOs, and any
other insurer "issu[ing] or renew[ing] any group or blanket policy of accident or health
insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-
178(c)(1) (1999) (encompassing an "accident and health insurance policy or certificate; a
nonprofit hospital or medical service corporation contract; a health maintenance
organization subscriber contract;.., a multiple employer welfare arrangement [plan]" or a
plan resulting from some other kind of benefit arrangement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 4099c (Supp. 2000) (requiring "[a] health insurance plan" providing coverage for other
prescription drugs to provide coverage for outpatient contraceptive services).
139. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J (covering nonprofit hospital or medical
service organizations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756, 2847-G, 4247 (covering
individual health insurance contracts, group and blanket health insurance, and HMOs,
respectively); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 698A.0415, 689A.0417, 689B.0377 (discussing
individual health insurance policies' coverage of FDA-approved prescription
contraceptive drugs and devices, individual health insurance coverage of contraceptives-
related outpatient care, and group and blanket health insurance coverage of
contraceptive-related outpatient care).
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as an applicable "health benefit plan,"'  has a statute explicitly
addressing contraceptive coverage in individual and group disability
policies.'4' If these individual and group disability policies cover
prescription drugs and devices, California requires that they also
include coverage of "a variety" of FDA-approved prescription
contraceptive methods.42  California, however, does exclude
"specialized health care service plan contract[s]"'' from its primary
mandate statute, in much the same manner that other states seek to
limit the application of contraception-related mandates to more
general insurance plans.'"
While the majority of the eight broad state mandates require that
"any" or "all" FDA-approved contraceptive drugs or devices be
covered where other prescription drugs and devices are covered, 14
the mandates of North Carolina, California, and Connecticut may not
be as broad in scope.' 46 The vague language of these three statutes
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(c)(1)(c).
141. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp. 2000). The disability insurance
provision, like the more general individual and group health care service plan provision,
also has a religious employer exemption. § 10123.196(d); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1367.25(b) (West 2000).
142. CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a).
144. See 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(a), 2(a) (Reg. Sess.) (limiting application of the
coverage mandate to the more general types of insurance plans as defined under section
38a-469 of the Connecticut General Statutes); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(c) (Supp.
2000) (excluding statutorily-designated "limited benefit policies" from mandate); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756, 2847-G (exempting certain more limited individual
and group insurance plans from contraception-related mandates); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-
178(c)(1)(a)-(m) (excluding more limited types of insurance plans from mandate); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c(b) (Supp. 2000) (excluding "benefit plans providing coverage
for specific disease[s] or other limited benefit coverage"). Limiting the mandate's
application to more comprehensive plans effectively eliminates a large portion of the
population that otherwise would benefit from contraception-related coverage.
145. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(c), (e)(2) ("any prescribed drug or device
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration for use as a
contraceptive"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J(1) (West 2000); id. tit. 24-A,
§§ 2756(1), 2847-G(1), 4247(1) ("all prescription contraceptives approved by the federal
Food and Drug Administration"); MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 15-826(b)(1) (Supp. 2000)
("any contraceptive drug or device that is approved by the United States Food and Drug
Administration"); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0415(1) (Michie Supp. 1999) ("[a]ny
type of drug or device for contraception ... which has been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-I, 420-A:17-c, 420-B:8-gg (Supp.
1999) ("all prescription contraceptive drugs and prescription contraceptive devices
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c(a)
(Supp. 2000) ("all prescription contraceptives and prescription contraceptive devices
approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration").
146. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1) ("shall include coverage for a
variety of federal Food and Drug Administration approved prescription contraceptive
methods"); 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(a), 2(a) (Reg. Sess.) ("shall not exclude coverage
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seemingly allows satisfaction of the mandate through coverage of
only some of the FDA-approved contraceptive methods.147 That is,
the California, North Carolina and Connecticut statutes prevent
exclusion of contraceptive coverage altogether, but they do not
dictate the breadth of options that must be made available.14  These
three states' mandates, then, are less broad than those of other states.
In comparison, Georgia's mandate allows the use of closed
formularies but requires that at least one kind of each of the five
FDA-approved prescription contraceptive methods be covered. 49
A related issue is whether an insured should have access to all
brands in any one FDA-approved category. Even in states with the
"any" and "all" language,150 such mandates would most likely be
construed by insurance companies to apply to "any" and "all" FDA-
approved categories rather than individual brands.'' At least with
the birth control pill, different brands can have markedly different
physiological effects on women.52  California anticipated this
for prescription contraceptive methods approved by the federal Food and Drug
Administration"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(c)(4) (1999) ("drugs or devices that
prevent pregnancy and that are approved by the United States Food and Drug
Administration for use as contraceptives").
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
148. California does provide a fall-back provision, however, where a birth control
method that is not covered otherwise must be covered where medically appropriate. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1) (West 2000)
149. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(e)(2); see also VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-
3407.5:1(C)(2) (Michie 1999) (requiring that an optional rider of contraceptive coverage
be made available to employers, but stating that such a rider does not preclude the use of
closed formularies provided one of each of the five FDA-approved prescription
contraceptive categories is included). For a discussion of the effectiveness and possible
side effects of all five FDA-approved contraceptive methods-the birth control pill,
Norplant, Depo-Provera, the IUD, and the emergency morning-after pill-see Planned
Parenthood, supra note 50.
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151. Judicial construction of this kind of language is not likely to occur in the near
future. In general, the time and cost involved in bringing a lawsuit will effectively deter
women from fighting to have their choice of covered contraceptive brands. See supra note
67. One ray of hope comes in the form of the recently filed Title VII based lawsuit in
Seattle. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Should Erickson and her fellow
plaintiffs succeed, Planned Parenthood and other organizations might be moved not only
to bring similar Title VII lawsuits in other federal districts, but also to bring suits in the
event that broad state mandates are nevertheless too narrowly construed. See supra notes
144-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
152. For an explanation of some of the distinctions between types of oral
contraceptives, see Sharon Snider, The Pill: 30 Years of Safety Concerns, at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/CONSUMERICON00027.html (Dec. 1990) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The varying levels of estrogen and progestin often produce
different effects in different users. See id. For an example of state legislation addressing
this concern, see HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:1-604.5(c) (Michie Supp. 1999) (requiring
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problem with a fall-back provision;153 however, residents of other
states with mandated coverage seemingly will either have to be
content with the covered brands available or pay out of pocket for a
preferred, non-covered brand. In North Carolina and Connecticut,
where coverage for all five FDA-approved contraceptive methods is
not explicitly required,5 4 the range of covered choices has the
potential to be even narrower.
For example, the North Carolina mandate explicitly excludes
Preven, the so-called "morning after" pill, and RU-486, the so-called
"abortion pill," despite the fact that both drugs are FDA-approved. 55
Georgia and Maine, in a similar statutory maneuver, explicitly
prevent any construction that pregnancy termination coverage is
mandated. 5 6 A strong argument against coverage of RU-486 under
the New Hampshire statute is grounded in the language of a provision
that speaks of coverage for "contraceptive methods to prevent
pregnancy."'57 Exclusions of these drugs in other states would depend
upon judicial construction of the general concept of "contraceptive"
that an optional rider of contraceptive coverage be made available to employers, but
stating that such a rider must include at least one brand of contraceptives from the
"monophasic, multiphasic, and the progestin-only categories"). Under this statute, an
insured may receive coverage for a brand of oral contraceptive not encompassed by her
plan if her use of covered brands has resulted in an adverse drug reaction or if her
physician considers her prone to an adverse reaction to the covered brands. See id.
153. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1) (West 2000) (requiring that
plans provide coverage for an FDA-approved prescription contraceptive method not
already covered if the treating health care provider deems none of the covered methods
appropriate considering the insured's medical or personal history); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000) (parallel provision requiring same). Again, the
California statutes speak only of "methods" and not "brands." The concept of consumer
choice of brands within a particular method still may not be statutorily required.
154. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. Insurance companies in those
states might choose to provide coverage for only some of the FDA-approved methods,
based on narrow interpretations of those states' statutes. Id.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(c)(4)(a)-(b) (1999). For a discussion of Preven, its
use and effects, see Nordenberg, supra note 12. For FDA approval of RU-486, see Food
and Drug Administration Approves Abortion Pill, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/
womenl09/28/abortion.pill.O2lindex.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(Sept. 29, 2000).
156. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6(c) (Supp. 2000) ("[Nothing contained in this
Code section shall be construed to require any insurance company to provide coverage for
abortion."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J(1) (West 2000) ("This section may not
be construed to apply to prescription drugs or devices that are designed to terminate a
pregnancy."); id. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756(1), 2847-G(1), 4247(1) (same). These statutes do not
address the issue of Preven coverage specifically. Differing views on whether Preven's
prevention of egg implantation could be considered abortive-and therefore whether
Preven could be interpreted as within these provisions-is discussed infra note 161.




or "contraception.' '5 8  Although RU-486 clearly terminates an
already-existing pregnancy, 59  Preven, a drug which prevents
implantation of any fertilized egg,16 occupies one of the grayer areas
in the reproductive fights controversy. While religious conservatives
view Preven as another permutation of abortion inducement,' 6' health
care professionals often have espoused the view that Preven is a
contraceptive, not an abortifacient 62 Insureds in all states mandating
coverage, therefore, most likely will find RU-486 excluded-either
explicitly or because of its fairly clear categorization as an
abortifacient rather than a contraceptive. Insureds may also
encounter difficulty in seeking coverage for Preven, depending on
how the applicable state statute is construed. North Carolina avoids
this issue of construction altogether by providing clear language
against the coverage of Preven.' 63
These more controversial methods of birth control, as well as
birth control coverage in general, led to the adoption of religion-
related exemption clauses in most statutes mandating coverage.
164
158. Cf supra note 145-48 and accompanying text.
159. Mifepristone for Termination of Early Pregnancy, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 2000, at
7,7.
160. See Information About the Preven Emergency Contraception Kit, at
http://www.preven.com/product/02-01-01.html (1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) ("The only definitive evidence indicates that [Preven works] by delaying or
preventing ovulation.").
161. See, e.g., Paul Carrier, Diocese Fights Bill on Birth Control, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Me.), Mar. 30, 1999, at Al, 1999 WL 4470049 (reporting that "[t]he Catholic
Church also opposes the [Maine coverage mandate] because it would require coverage for
the so-called 'morning after' pill"). Preven is functionally equivalent to an IUD, a device
clearly classified as a contraceptive, because both prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to
the lining of the uterus. See Planned Parenthood, supra note 50. From a strictly anti-
abortion viewpoint-disregarding the view taken by some religions that any interference
with conception is immoral-religious opposition to coverage for contraceptives that do
not interfere with the implantation of a fertilized egg is hard to understand. A report by
the Alan Guttmacher Institute found that use of contraceptives reduced the probability
that a woman would have an abortion by eighty-five percent. Susan A. Cohen, The Role
of Contraception in Reducing Abortion, at http:llwww.agi-usa.org/pubs/libl9.html (1997)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
162. See, e.g., ARHP Urges N.C. State Senate to Reconsider Amendment to
Contraceptive Equity Bill, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 2, 1999, 1999 WL 4636297 (noting the
view of Dr. James Trussell, board member of the Association of Reproductive Health
Professionals, that emergency contraception is just that-contraception-and not to be
confused with abortion-inducers such as RU-486).
163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
164. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 1999) ("Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, a religious employer may request a health care service
plan contract without coverage for federal Food and Drug Administration approved
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employer's religious tenets.");
1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(b), 2(b) (Reg. Sess.) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
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Such exemptions vary in their definitions of exempted religious
entities.165 For example, Nevada's statute exempts religiously-
affiliated insurers from providing the mandated coverage. A more
typical exemption, however, is for the employer who refuses on
this section, any insurance company, hospital or medical service corporation, or health
care center may issue to a religious employer ... [a] health insurance policy that excludes
coverage for prescription contraceptive methods which are contrary to the religious
employer's bona fide religious tenets."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-3(2) (West
2000) ("A religious employer may request and a nonprofit hospital or medical service
organization or nonprofit health care service organization shall grant an exclusion under
the policy or contract for the coverage required by this section if the required coverage
conflicts with the religious employer's bona fide religious beliefs and practices."); id. tit.
24-A, §§ 2756(2), 2847-G(2), 4247(2) (extending the religious employers exclusion to
insurers and HMOs); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c) (Supp. 2000) ("A religious
organization may request and an entity subject to this section shall grant the request for an
exclusion from coverage under the policy, plan, or contract for the coverage ... if the
required coverage conflicts with the religious organization's bona fide religious beliefs and
practices."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0417(5) (Michie Supp. 1999) ("An insurer
which offers or issues such a policy of health insurance and which is affiliated with a
religious organization is not required to provide the coverage for health care service
related to contraceptives required by this section if the insurer objects on religious
grounds."); id. §§ 689A.0415(5), 689B.0377(5) (applying the religious employer exemption
to group health insurance policies and policies covering prescription drugs or devices);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (1999) ("A religious employer may request an insurer
providing a health benefit plan to provide to the religious employer a health benefit plan
that excludes coverage for prescription contraceptive drugs or devices that are contrary to
the employer's religious tenets."). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (Supp. 2000) (no
exemption); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-I, 420-A:17-c, 420-B:8-gg (Supp. 1999)
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (1999) (same).
165. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (specifying four conditions
for the religious employer exemption: 1) the entity's purpose is to inculcate certain
religious values, 2) the employees of the entity primarily share the entity's religious values,
3) people served by the entity primarily share the entity's religious values, and 4) the
entity is a non-profit organization as defined by the Internal Revenue Code); 1999 Conn.
Acts 99-79, §§ 1(f), 2(f) (Reg. Sess.) ("As used in this section, 'religious employer' means
an employer that is a 'qualified church-controlled organization' as defined in 26 USC 3121
or a church-affiliated organization."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J(2)(West
2000); id. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756(2), 2847-G(2); 4247(2) (" '[R]eligious employer' means an
employer that is a church, convention or association of churches or an elementary or
secondary school that is controlled, operated or principally supported by a church or by a
convention or association of churches" as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(w)(3)(A) (1994) and
that qualifies as tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994)); MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 15-826(c) (Supp. 2000) (no qualifying definition of "religious organization," but
inference that religious organization is an employer because it must give notice of its
exemption to affected employees under (c)(2)); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415(5),
689A.0417(5), 689B.0377(5) (Michie Supp. 1999) (providing an exemption for insurers
affiliated with a religious organization, but providing no definition of a religious
organization); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (1999) ("religious employer" may be
exempt where three conditions are met: 1) the entity's organization and operation has
religious purpose and the entity is tax exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); 2) one of the
primary purposes of the entity is the inculcation of religious values; and 3) employees of
the entity primarily share the entity's religious values).
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religious grounds to purchase a plan that covers contraception. 166
Connecticut is the only state to allow an individual employee to
refuse the mandated coverage because of conflicts with his or her
religious belief system.167  In all state mandates with religious
exemptions, an insured must be notified of any exemption which
affects him or her under a given plan,'" and states other than
Maryland and Nevada' 69 require that, despite any relevant religious
exemption, coverage for contraceptives prescribed for certain medical
reasons may not be excluded. 70 The medical reasons that come
under these exceptions to religious exemptions are either non-
contraceptive in nature or contraception necessary to preserve the life
or health of the insured.'7 '
These exceptions to the religious employer-and, in Nevada's
case, to the religious insurer-exemptions have the potential to
swallow the exemptions altogether, at least in terms of the oral
166. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415(5), 689A.0417(5), 689B.0377(5)
(exempting qualifying insurers), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)
(exempting religious employers), and 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(b)(2), 2(b)(2) (Reg.
Sess.) (exempting religious employers); id. §§ 1(f), 2(f) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 2332-J(2) (same), and id. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756(2), 2847-G(2), 4247(2) (same), and N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (same).
167. 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(b)(2), 2(b)(2) (Reg. Sess.). Identical language in the
Connecticut provisions allows insurers to issue a policy or rider that excludes coverage for
prescription contraceptive methods "upon the written request of an individual who states
in writing that prescription contraceptive methods are contrary to such individual's
religious or moral beliefs."
168. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(2) (written notice); 1999 Conn.
Acts 99-79 §§ 1(c), 2(c) (Reg. Sess.) (written notice in no less than ten point type that must
appear in the policy, application and sales brochure for the policy); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2332-J(2) (written notice); id. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756(2), 2847-G(2), 4247(2) (written
notice); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)(2) ("reasonable and timely notice"); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415(5), 689A.0417(5), 689B.0377(5) (written notice); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (written notice in no less than ten point type that must appear in
the policy, application, and sales brochure for the health benefit plan).
169. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415,
689A.0417, 689B.0377.
170. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(c) (listing as possible reasons for
prescription other than contraception "decreasing the risk of ovarian cancer or eliminating
symptoms of menopause," or any other use "necessary to preserve the life or health" of an
insured); 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 §§ 1(d), 2(d) (Reg. Sess.) ("Nothing in this section shall
be construed as authorizing ... [the exclusion of] coverage for prescription drugs ordered
by a health care provider with prescriptive authority for reasons other than contraceptive
purposes."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2332-J(2) ("This section may not be construed
as authorizing... [the exclusion of] coverage for prescription drugs prescribed for reasons
other than contraceptive purposes or for prescription contraception that is necessary to
preserve the life or health of a covered person."); id. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756(2), 2847-G(2),
4247(2) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (containing language substantially similar
to that of the Maine provisions).
171. See supra note 170.
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contraceptive pill. Because the pill is known to reduce the incidence
of ovarian and endometrial cancers, benign cysts of the breasts and
ovaries, pelvic inflammatory disease, and heavy, irregular
menstruation, significant, non-contraceptive medical reasons exist to
prescribe its use-even when the insured also intends to benefit from
the drug's primary function as a contraceptive.172 Indeed, health care
professionals could prescribe the pill and cite non-contraceptive
health benefits as a justification, even where the factual reality is that
an employee of a religious employer needs coverage for
contraception. 73
In sum, North Carolina's legislature, having weighed the relevant
policy considerations, has opted to join those states requiring broad
coverage for contraceptives. Referencing the perceived gender-based
inequity in the insurance industry, one state representative supportive
of North Carolina's mandate said wryly, "It's simply a matter of
fairness among other things. I'm not going to ask for a show of hands
about how many [of the North Carolina representatives] use Viagra
and cover them with their insurance."' 74  Certain features of the
North Carolina statute, however, limit its effective breadth. Although
the statute encompasses most comprehensive insurance plans, it
specifically excludes certain types of more limited plans. 5 The North
Carolina law also does not state explicitly that "any" or "all" FDA-
approved contraceptive methods must be covered.7 6 Satisfaction of
the mandate arguably could be achieved through provision of
coverage for only some of the available and approved contraceptive
methods. 77 Women would be left to pay out of pocket for the use of
non-covered methods. 78 Moreover, where different brands of birth
control are substantively different, such as in the varying estrogen to
progestin ratios in different brands of the pill, the North Carolina law
provides neither coverage of all brands within a particular method
172. See Snider, supra note 152; Nordenberg, supra note 12.
173. For certain women, however, the pill can pose certain health risks. These women,
such as those who are over thirty-five and smoke and those who have certain medical
conditions such as a history of blood clots, would have a harder time arguing that the pill
was being prescribed for health benefits. See Nordenberg, supra note 12.
174. Associated Press, Birth Control Coverage Approved, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro,
N.C.), June 17, 1999, at B1 (quoting representaive Alma Adams (D.-Guilford)).
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178(c)(1)(a)-(m) (1999).
176. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
178. Putting women in this position is not much different from having no mandate at
all, given that most plans provide coverage for some form of contraception, if only
sterilization. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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nor a fall-back provision for coverage where medically appropriate. 79
Fortunately, the statute affords some flexibility in terms of the
religious employer exemption and exceptions to that exemption.180 In
particular, the ability of North Carolina health care providers to
prescribe contraceptives for health-related reasons even where a
religious employer objects may effectively eliminate the religious
exemption, at least regarding the birth control pill.81
Criticism of legislative control over the content of insurance
plans remains strident, especially in the provocative area of control
over reproductive rights.'" More than forty years since the
revolutionary contraceptive innovation of the birth control pill,
however, free market forces have not worked to produce equitable
coverage in the insurance industry, and women, given the time and
expense of possible lawsuits, have been hesitant in the past to resort
to litigation to enforce their rights to equal coverage. 83 Unless Ms.
Erickson and her co-plaintiffs begin a trend of successful Title VII
litigation,1 4 legislation, although not ideal, appears to be the only
viable vehicle for equitable insurance reform. Moreover, if the
Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraception Coverage Act
continues to lie dormant in congressional committee, 85 state
mandates alone must provide legislative relief. Ultimately, even the
more limited state mandates have symbolic value, representing as
they do the recognition that responsibility for family planning should
not rest on women's shoulders-and pocketbooks-alone. Through
section 58-3-178, North Carolina takes a notable step in that
direction.
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179. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 128, 168-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 67.
184. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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